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Introduction 
The Internal Revenue Code mandates that when 
taxpayers make taxable gifts; they must file gilt tax 
returns. Some taxpayers comply with that mandate; 
others do not. Regarding the latter, the penalty 
structure is toothless and rarely applies. Noncom-
pliant taxpayers are essentially at liberty to make 
undisclosed taxable gifts with impunity. If Congress 
truly wants to maintain the integrity of the transfer 
tax system, it must reform the penalty structure 
associated with the failure to file gift tax returns. 
It is not merely an academic issue. There is 
compelling evidence that the gift tax return compli-
ance rate is abysmal. The IRS Estate and Gift Tax 
Examinations team recently conducted a nation-
wide audit of intrafamily real property transfers 
involving little or no consideration.2 The noncom-
IGratuitous transfers are taxable gifts if they exceed the 
annual exclusion ($14,000), are not gifts of a "present interest/' 
and do not qualify for any other gift tax exclusion (e.g., the 
payment of educational and medical expenses on another 
ta"llayer's behall). Section 2503. 
William P. Barrett, "IRS Targets Family Real Estate Trans-
fers," Forbes (Mar. 24, 2011); Scot! D. Michel and Beth Shapiro 
Kaufman, "Unreported Gifts of Real Property: Time for Volun-
tary Disclosure," Tax Notes, Aug. t 2011, p. 513; Jasper G. Taylor 
llir "IRS Estate and Gift Tax Compliance Initiative Targets Real 
(Footnote continued in next column,) 
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pliance rate was stunning: An estimated 60 to 90 
percent of taxpayers making transfers failed to file 
gift tax returns.' 
Existing Penalty Regime and Its Shortcomings 
The code imposes three taxes on the gratuitous 
transfer of wealth: gift, estate, and generation-
skipping transfer taxes" Those three transfer tax 
systems function interdependently. Consider that 
the gift and estate taxes have the same so-called 
applicable exclusion amount ($5.25 million) 5 To the 
extent not used during life, the balance shields 
. testamentary transfers from tax.- Because the gift 
and estate taxes use the same applicable exclusion 
amount, for computational purposes, a taxpayer's 
adjusted taxable gifts are added back into a taxpay-
er's adjusted gross estate to determine the taxpay-
er's overall transfers subject to tax" Potentially 
applicable to both inter vivos and testamentary 
transfers, the GSTT is similar in structure to the gilt 
and estate taxes, but it applies only to transfers to 
so-called skip persons - essentially, heirs who are 
two or more generations younger than the trans-
feror.s The code provides for a GSTT exemption 
($5.25 million) that parallels the applicable exclu-
sion amount'; more specifically, taxpayers may ap-
ply their GSTT exemption to lifetime giftslO and, to 
the extent not exhausted, to testamentary bequests11 
in order to shield the transfers from the GSTT. 
Taxpayers who make taxable gifts are required to 
file gift tax returns (that is, Form 709, "U.S. Gift (and 
Generation-Skipping Transfer) Tax Return").12 A 
taxpayer who fails to file a gtft tax return must pay 
a penalty equal to the amount of tax due plus 5 
Property Transfers Between Related Parties"; Josh Ungerman" 
"The New Gift Tax Audits: IRS Identifies Non-Filers Using State 
Property Records," Forbes (Oct. 19,2011). . 
~aylor, supra note 2. 
45ee generally John R Luckey, "A History of the Federal Gift, 
Estate, and Generation-Skipping Transfer Taxes,." Congressional 
Research Service (2003). 
5Section 2505. The amount is adjusted annually for inflation. 
Seetion 2010(c)(3). 
'Section 2010. 
7Section 2001(b)(1)(B). 
·Section 2613(0). 
'Section 2631(a). This amount is adjusted annually for infla-
tion. Section 2631(c). 
lOSection 2632. 
HId. 
"Section 6019(.). 
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percent per monfu for each monfu's delinquency, 
up to a 25 percent maximum,13 In addition to the 
failure-to-file penalty, fuere is a failure-to-pay pen-
alty equal to fue amount of tax due and owing times 
0.5 percent per month for each month's delin-
quency, up to a 25 percent maximum." The faHure-
to-file and pay penalties overlap (fuat is, the 
application of one causes a corresponding reduction 
of the other),lS Taxpayers who willfully fail to file a 
gift tax return may also be subject to criminal 
sanctions,'6 but those are rarely imposedP Practi-
tioners involved in situations in which taxpayers do 
not file gift tax returns risk criminal charges or 
referral to fue IRS Office of Professional Responsi-
bility for violating Circular 23018 
Consider fue following example, Suppose a tax-
payer who had previously not made taxable gifts 
transfers title to a farm, valued at $6,264,000, to her 
daughter in 2013, After accounting for the arumal 
exclusion and applicable exclusion amount, fue 
amount of fue taxable gift is $1 million (that is, 
$6,264,000 less the annual exclusion of $14,000 and 
the applicable exclusion amount of $5,25 million), 
Suppose further that the taxpayer, without seeking 
an extension, fails to file Form 709 until July 2, 2014, 
and then pays the $400,000 gift tax due,19 Under 
that fact pattern, the applicable penalties for fue 
three-month delinquency would be as follows: (i) 
failure-to-file penalty of 854,00020 and (ii) failure-to-
pay penalty of $6,000,21 The combined penalty of 
$60,000 ($54,000 plus 56,000) presumably would be 
substantial enough to encourage compliance with 
fue requirement that a return be filed, 
But in most cases, the existing penalty regime 
proves hollow because, as noted, despite the gift tax 
return submission requirement, there is often no 
concomitant tax payment requirement. Taxpayers 
generally either lack the financial wherewithal to 
part with millions of dollars during their lifetimes 
1'Seciion 6651(a)(1), 
"Section 6651(a)(2), 
"Section 6651(c)(1), 
16Section 7203, 
17See Michel and Kaufman .. supra note 2, at 514 (stating that 
although criminal charges for the failure to file gift tax returns 
are rare, the IRS will pursue criminal charges in egregious 
cases). 
18Id, at 514-515, 
19The $1 million taxable gilt multiplied by the 40 percent gift 
tax rale, Section 2502(.), 
2°In determining the failure-la-file penalty, the $400,000 of 
tax due should be multiplied by 15 percent (5 percent x 3 (the 
number of months the taxpayer was delinquent)) less 1.5 
percent (i.e., the failure-ta-pay penalty), or 13.5 percent. 
21In deteI'ITrining the failure-te-pay penalty amount, the 
$400,000' of tax due should be multiplied by 1.5 percent (0.5 
percent x 3 (the munber of months the taxpayer was delin-
quent)), 
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or are loath to make taxable gifts in which they 
would encounter an immediate tax burden, Further, 
that the gift tax is tax exclusive (that is, the appli-
cable rate is applied to fue net gift, exclusive of gift 
taxes) and the estate tax is tax inclusive (that is, the 
applicable rate is applied to the gross estate before 
taxes are deducted) does not appear to sway tax-
payers to accelerate the depletion of their ultimate 
estates through gift giving, 
Given taxpayers' reluctance to make gifts fuat 
would generate a tax liability, even financially well-
to-do taxpayers22 rarely make gifts that in aggregate 
exceed fue threshold of fue applicable exclusion 
amount.23 While taxable gifts of less than the appli-
cable exclusion amount must be reported on a gift 
tax retum,24 taxpayers who fail to file may never-
theless not face a penalty, Why? The code applies 
failure-to-file penalties only when tax is actually 
due,'" Note that when the IRS recently conducted 
nationwide gift tax audits and discovered wide-
spread noncompliance, it "had determined that 
ninety-seven taxpayers had violated gift tax report-
ing requirements by failing to file, and just twelve 
cases resulted in assessment of tax and penalties,"z6 
Treating the failure-to-file gift tax returns with 
impunity creates immense practical concerns. Sup-
pose in 2014 Taxpayer J purchases the title to a 
house for $1,014,000 and immediately gives that 
title to her daughter but does not file a gift tax 
return despite having made a $1 million gift (fuat is, 
22For example, Sam Walton reportedly began giving away 
shares ofWal-Mart stock to his children in 1953 through a family 
limited partnership and paid a relatively modest amount of gift 
tax that resulted in billions of dollars escaping estate tax at his 
death in 1992, See Zachary R. Mider, "How Wal-Mart's Waltons 
Maintain Their Billionaire Fortune/' Bloomberg (Sept. ll,2013), 
available at http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-09-12/ho 
w-wal-mart-s-waltons-maintain-their-bilHonaire-iortune-taxes.h 
tml, 
:mSee IRS Statistics of Income website, available at http:/ I 
www,irs.gov/uac/SOI-Tax-Stats-Total-Gifts-of-Donor,-Total-G 
ifts!-Deductions!~Credits!-and-Net-Gift-Tax (indicating that of 
the 219,544 gift tax returns that were filed in 2011 (the Jast year 
for which data are available), approximately 3,000 of the returns 
involved gifts of $1 million or more (the applicable exclusion 
amount for 2011), and only approximately 11,000 tax returns 
resulted in the payment of tax). 
24See supra notes 1 and 12. 
25By way of contrast, in the income tax sphere, there is 
usually a third party (e.g., an employer or financial institution) 
providing payments and submitting tax information returns, 
which makes the failure to file a tax return associated with the 
income tax difficult. Section 6041(a). 'When it comes to giving 
and receiving gifts, there is no third-party reporting because the 
only candidate for such reporting - the recipient of the gift -
has no reporting obligation that would enable the IRS to 
detennine that a taxable gift was made. 
26See Ungerman~ supra note 2. 
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$1,014,000 Jess the $14,000 annual exclusion). Sup-
pose 20 years later, Taxpayer J dies with a taxable 
estate of $9 million. Assuming the executor of 
Taxpayer J's estate is not her daughter, it is likely 
that the executor will not be aware of the decedent's 
gift made two decades earlier; therefore, the trans-
fer will not likely be treated as an adjusted taxabJe 
gift and added to Taxpayer J's gross estate. Instead, 
·the decedent's executor will probably report a tax-
able estate of only $9 million, rather than $10 
million had the taxable gift been added back into 
the adjusted estate as required under the codeP 
That oversight will produce an ill-gotten benefit to 
Taxpayer fs estate heirs of $400,000, namely, the 
estate tax savings associated with Taxpayer fs 
failure to report the earlier $1 million gift (that is, $1 
million x 40 percent estate tax rate).28 
Transactions similar to the foregoing example are 
probably repeated hundreds, if not thousands, of 
times annually with nonfiling taxpayers bearing no 
consequences. The absence of penalty imposition 
signifies that the penalties for failure to file gift tax 
returns are wholly inadequate. In drafting the pen-
alty, Congress likely sought to parallel the failure-
to-file penalty applicable to delinquent income tax 
return filings,29 but that replication overlooks a 
central distinction between the income and gift 
taxes: The former generally results in a lax being 
imposed, and the latter does not. Further, the gift 
tax is unlike the income tax in another crucial 
respect - namely, the amount of the gift in the 
current year has a potentially significant impact on 
the tax on gratuitous transfers in subsequent years, 
making the need for proper return filing pivotal to 
its integrity. Using the same platform for both the 
income and gift penalties is thus nonsensical and 
should be abandoned. 
Reforming the Gift Tax Penalty Structure 
The research regarding tax compliance indicates 
that there are several possible factors that contribute 
to taxpayers being compliant.3D Those factors in-
27 See supra note 7, 
28Because the limitations period does not expire in those 
cases when no return is filedf noncompliant taxpayers always 
risk a future audit. Section 6501(c)(3). Although this is apt 10 be 
a rare occurrence, this may periodically occur. SeeF e.g., Bridget 
J. Crawford and Theresa Fortin, JlSumner Redstone's 40-Year-
Old Gift," Tax Notes, Aug. 19, 2013, p. 833 (in a settlement in 
which Redstone transferred shares to a family-owned business 
into a trust for his children and never reported such transfer, the 
IRS is at liberty to audit such transfer). 
. "Section 6651(a)(1). 
3GJames Alm, Gary H. McClelland, and William D. Schulze, 
"Why Do People Pay Taxes?" 48 J. of Public Economics 21 (1992) 
(explaining the diverse reasons taxpayers comply). 
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elude compliance norms31 and deterrence under an 
economic cost benefit analysis?2 Although the re-
search regarding tax compliance is inconclusive,'" 
there is a general consensus among politicians, 
academics, and the general public that the existence 
of tax penalties is an important contributory factor 
to tax compliance.34 
Given the important role tax penalties play in 
fostering tax compliance, choosing the right penalty 
structure - that is, the one that yields the highest 
rate of taxpayer compliance for the least possible 
administrative cost - is of pivotal importance. That 
is another way of saying that not all penalties 
function with the same level of efficacy. As drafted, 
the failure-to-file penalty for gift tax return submis-
sions is underinclusive and has proven ineffectual. 
Yet broadening the application of the penalty to 
apply in every instance when a taxpayer fails to file 
a gift tax return raises important political concerns. 
Consider that the code contalns several penalties for 
failure to file tax returns even when no tax is owed. 
For example, if a U.S. shareholder owns an interest 
in a controlled foreign company and fails to file 
Form 5471, a $10,000 annual penalty applies. 35 
Likewise, in those instances when a taxpayer re-
ceives a foreign gift that exceeds $10,000 and fails to 
file Form 3520, a failure-to-file penalty applies at a 
rate equal to 5 percent of the amount of the foreign 
gift for each month the failure continues (not to 
exceed 25 percent).3. In the sphere of tax informa-
tion returns, fixed-dollar-amount penalties abound 
for those taxpayers who do not submit required tax 
information returns on a timely basis.37 
31Leandra Lederman, uThe Interplay Between Nonns and 
Enforcemenl in Tax Compliance," 64 Ohio St. L.J. 1453 (2003); 
Susan C. Morse, "Tax Compliance and Norm Formation Under 
High-Penalty Regimes," 44 CO>1n. L. Rev. 675 (2012); Eric A. 
Posner, "Law and Sodal Norms: The Case of Tax Compliance/' . 
86 Va. L. Rev. 1781 (2000). 
32See generally American Bar Association Commission on 
Taxpayer Compliance, "Report and Recommendations on Tax-
payer Compliance," 41 Tax Law. 329, 348-349 (1987). 
33James Almp Isabel Sanchez, and Ana de Juan, "Economic 
and Noneconomic Factors in Tax Compliance," 48 Kyklos 3 
(1995). As Joel 51emrod notes, "there is still much dispute .bout 
the proper conceptual model to use in addressing" tax compli-
ance. Joel Slemrod, Introduction to Why People Pal} Taxes: Tax 
Compliance and Enforcement 1, 2 (Joel Slemrod ed., 1992). 
::.wSee generally Joshua D. Blank, "Collateral Compliance/' 162 
U. Pa. L. Rev. _ (2014), available at http://p.pers.ssm.com/ 
sol3/papexs.cim?abstracUd=2032788; Michael Doran, "Tax 
Penalties and Tax Compliance," 46 Harv. J. on Legis. 111 (2009); 
Alex Raskolnikov, "Crime and Punishment in Taxation: Deceit, 
Deterrence, and the Self-Adjusting Penalty," 106 Calum. L. Rev . 
56912006). 
3 Section 6038(b)(1). 
"'Section 6039P(c). 
"E.g., sections 6721(.) and 6722(a). 
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But simply broadening the penalty for failure to 
file a gift tax return would likely be politically 
unpopular. While Congress could institute a failure-
to-me penalty equal to the greater of either $10,000 
or 5 percent per month upon the tax due and owing, 
and could even apply that penalty in those instances 
when the taxpayer innocently made taxable gifts, 
not realizing that a tax return filing obligation 
exists, it would probably not want to do so. The gift 
tax is poorly understood by many taxpayers, so 
burdensome penalties for inadvertent violations 
would strike both Congress and the public as being 
unduly harsh. Congress would not, for example, 
want to impose the penalty on a taxpayer who has 
a $400,000 net worth and benevolently assists his 
adult child in purchasing her first home by making 
a cash gift of $20,000 but mistakenly does not me a 
gift tax return. That taxpayer's delinquency was 
simply not motivated by transfer tax avoidance and 
does not deserve stringent penalty. 
We propose a modest alternative that would 
avoid the fate associated with a broad-based pen-
alty while still making the failure-to-file penalty 
more efficacious. A penalty for failure to file a gift 
tax return that is equal to a set dollar amount (say, 
$10,000) should apply only in those instances when 
a taxpayer fails to file a gift tax return and, at the 
time of transfer, the net worth of the taxpayer 
exceeds a set dollar threshold level (say, $1 million 
and, in the case of married taxpayers, $2 million).38 
To simplify the administration of that proposal, 
aside from marketable securities, a taxpayer's net 
worth could be measured using the adjusted tax 
basis dollar amounts of his assets. Reliance on 
historical tax basis figures would obviate the need 
to secure fair market value property appraisals for 
items such as real estate, closely held business 
interests, and artwork. (Admittedly, to avoid pen-
alty application, taxpayers might intentionally seek 
to diminish or camouflage his net worth. However, 
the penalty itself is too small to warrant those types 
of maneuvers; and, in any event, taxpayers who go 
through extreme avoidance exercises risk criminal 
sanctions.) The existing penalty structure would 
remain applicable in those instances when a gift tax 
was due and owing (that is, a failure-to-file penalty 
of 5 percent per month for every month there is a 
delinquency, up to a 25 percent maximum, and the 
failure-to-pay penalty of 0.5 percent per month for 
every month there is a delinquency, up to a 25 
percent maximum).3. 
38The doubling of the proposed exemption amount reflects 
the doubling of the applicable exclusion amount through the 
new portability rules. Section 2010(c)(4). 
39See supra notes 13 and 14. 
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By establishing a minimum penalty limited to 
those instances when taxpayers have a net worth 
beyond a designated threshold, the failure-to-file 
penalty would not apply to most transfers. How-
ever, the failure-to-file penalty would apply in those 
instances when the gift tax is likely to be fulfilling 
its primary historic role as a protector of the estate 
tax base.40 Some commentators might advocate a 
higher net worth application threshold equal to the 
applicable exclusion amount at the time the gift is 
made. At a lower net worth threshold amount, their 
concern might be that the penalty would be too 
inclusive. We, however, assume that those taxpay-
ers whose net worths exceed a set threshold (as 
proposed, $1 million) are on the economic path to 
having a taxable estate and, accordingly; should be 
subject to heightened scrutiny. Ultimately, the pre-
cise dollar threshold is a political decision to be 
made by Congress. 
Application of the Proposal 
Were Congress to enact the proposed legislative 
reform, no longer would financially well-to-do tax-
payers - those to whom transfer tax is most likely 
to apply - be able to scoff at their gift tax return 
filing obligations without the fear and risk of being 
penalized. 
Reconsider the earlier fact pattern in which a 
taxpayer wished to financially assist her daughter's 
purchase of a home, but assume the taxpayer's net 
worth is $4 million rather than $400,000 and the 
amount of the gift is $200,000 rather than $20,000. 
Under current law, if the taxpayer makes the 
$200,000 gift and fails to file a gift tax return, there 
are no consequences associated with her dereliction; 
under our proposal, the same dereliction would 
result in the imposition of a $10,000 penalty (assum-
ing the IRS conducted an audit that uncovered this 
failure). Given the severity of that penalty, most 
risk-adverse taxpayers would take the necessary 
steps to ensure ming compliance.41 
40H. Corrun. on Ways and Means, Report on Revenue Act of 
1932, H.R. Rep. No. 72-708, at 8 (1932) (indicating that gift tax 
was needed lito assist in the collection of the income and estate 
taxes, and prevent their avoidance through the splitting up of 
estates during the lifetime of a taxpayer"); S. Conun. on Finance, 
Report on Revenue Bill of 1932, S. Rep. No. 72-665, at 11 (1932) 
(liAs a protection to both estate and income taxes, a gift tax is 
imposed"). Ways and Means Chair Charles R. Crisp reiterated 
this stated purpose in floor debates. 75th Congo Rec. 5691 (1932) 
(statement of Crisp) ("The estate tax, without a mother [gift] tax 
to protect it, might easily be evaded"): 
41In such instances, tax return preparers would likely 
strongly advocate the submission of a gift tax return for fear that 
if they failed to make such a recommendation, they could be 
sued for malpractice based on their failure to advise their clients 
of the risks associated with not filing. See generally Jacob L. 
(Footnote continued on next page.) 
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The effects of enhanced gift tax compliance 
would be felt in all three transfer tax arenas. First, 
enhanced gift tax return compliance should result 
in more robust gift tax revenue collections because 
taxpayers, through filings, would be forced to ac-
knowledge the exhaustion of their applicable exclu-
sion amounts. Second, because taxpayers would be 
more apt to account for the reduction of their 
applicable exclusion amounts, they would have 
correspondingly less available upon their demise, 
resulting in more robust estate tax revenue collec-
tions. Finally, some or all of a taxpayer's lifetime 
gifts may absorb a taxpayer's available GSTT ex-
emption; that absorption should ultimately yield 
greater GSTT collections or, alternatively, estate tax 
revenue collections as taxpayers strategically avoid 
transfers to skip persons. 
Some taxpayers and tax practitioners may never-
theless object to the proposal. Taxpayers who make 
small taxable gifts (for example, a $1,000 gift of a 
future interest) and who accidentally fail to ffie a 
gift tax return may vociferously complain that a flat 
minimum penalty is too harsh. If Congress shares 
that concern, it can refine the penalty to make it 
equal to the greater of the following: (i) the lesser of 
(a) $10,000 or (b) half of the amount transferred or 
(ii) 5 percent per month times the tax due and 
owing.42 Tax practitioners, too, may oppose reform, 
asserting that some of their clients may be reluctant 
to disclose their net worth and thereby negate their 
ability to ascertain penalty applicability. As long as 
tax practitioners point out the need to submit a gift 
tax return to their clients' attention, however, the 
clients themselves should decide whether a gift tax 
return submission is warranted. 
Notwithstanding the potential downsides, adop-
tion of our legislative proposal makes a lot of sense. 
One of the fundamental virtues associated with 
enhanced taxpayer compliance measures is that 
they are able to produce more revenue without 
increasing taxes or necessitating a broadening of the 
tax base. And, if those measures can be instituted 
without raising taxpayers' administrative burdens, 
they can prove to be a real boon to the code's 
integrity. The legislative compliance measure that 
we propose meets the following condition: It would 
increase revenue with virtually no additional ad-
ministrative burdens to taxpayers. Congress should 
therefore pass it with little controversy or opposi-
tion. 
Todresl "Tax Practice: Areas in Which It Occurs and the Measure 
of Damages - an Updale," 78 St. John's L. Rev. 1011 (2004). 
42Jn the case of the gift of $1,000 future interest, the resulting 
failure-la-file penalty would equal $500. 
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Conclusion 
For the past several decades, penalties for failure 
to file a gift tax return have rarely been applied. 
That is in dramatic contrast to the number of times 
taxpayers have endured the failure-to-ffie penalty 
in the income tax sphere.'3 Those dichotomous 
outcomes are attributable to one source - the 
applicable exclusion amount, which shields most 
taxable gifts from gift tax exposure and simultane-
ously from the failure-to-ffie penalty. As currently 
constructed, the penalty for failure to ffie a gift tax 
return is thus ill-designed and demands congres-
sional reformation. 
Our proposal to establish a minimum penalty 
threshold coupled with a net worth requirement 
would spark filing compliance among econ6mically 
well-to-do taxpayers (that is, the population of 
taxpayers most likely to be subject to transfer tax). 
Implementation of this proposed reform would not 
only bode well for gift tax compliance, but due to 
the close kinship between the gift tax and estate and 
GSTTs, it would enhance the compliance rates as-
sociated with both of these taxes as well. 
We acknowledge that our proposed reform mea-
sure would not constitute a panacea for transfer tax 
revitalization. Instead, our reform initiative is much 
more modest in nature, simply seeking to ensure 
that taxpayers fulfill their tax return filing obliga-
tions. The importance of tax return ffiing obliga-
tions, however, should never be minimized; to 
emphasize this point, Congress should immediately 
enact the proposed legislative compliance measure. 
43For a delineation of penalty application, see generally IRS 
Dala Book 2011, al 42, Table 17. 
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